Here's the rub. If you're going to play geopolitics, you have to be able to convince others that your game plan is worth following. Otherwise, no one plays the game and you end up playing with yourself. That's the nature of legitimacy, even for hegemons. The US, despite its self-image, does not have the capacity to play beyond the rules. This is one of the lessons of Iraq for the rest of the world -- the US is no longer a hegemon whose hegemony is based in international norms of legitimacy. So, if you're willing then to break agreements in order to gain some other advantage, it's good if you can break your agreements in such a way that others do not view the new arrangement as a threat. Failing this, the implied threat ought to gain some advantage for a nation playing the neo-realist game of self-advantage above all.
What else can be read into this maneuver? Yes, Bush has given up on nuclear non-proliferation as an international regime and substituted it with a relativistic policy of nuclear non-proliferation only among states the administration dislikes. The real level of threat of these states is notoriously unclear, but the rhetorical level of threat is heartily manipulated by the administration. But the principle of non-proliferation has been tossed on the trash-heap. Nothing against India. It is a powerful state that deserves a seat in the sphere of international affairs. But the basis of this move is a disaster, coming especially upon American denial of India's claim to a seat at the UN Security Council.
First, it tells Pakistan to screw itself. This will be the end of any hope for capturing Bin Laden.
Second, it tells China to screw itself. At a time when there's more saber (or warhead)-rattling over Taiwan, this is really poor timing.
Third, the US now more than ever perhaps needs to rebuild international faith in its ability to build a more peaceful world. This administration has done absolutely nothing in this regard. In fact, it does the opposite by further undermining the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
But, fourth, even if looking at the "national interests" of the US, one wonders what is gained here. There are some obvious answers beyond the platitudes of "largest democracy" and so on. These answers might include simply developing ties with a burgeoning economy, a large and intelligent society, a geopolitically important state, etc. But, and this is speculation, could we also see this as a sign of a failed Middle East policy? That is, given the massive, failing attempt to gain a foothold in the Middle East and Central Asia, does India become the less aggressive geopolitical answer? And then, further, to what goal?
Mr Bush said he would "seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies" and work with "friends and allies to adjust international regimes" for cooperation and trade with India.See also this Washington Post editorial.Many experts said such a move, which rewards the atomic arsenal India manufactured in secret, would undermine US efforts to prevent Iran and North Korea from doing the same.
It would also incense Pakistan, India's nuclear-capable neighbour.
There was also some scepticism that the Nuclear Suppliers Group, consisting of 40 countries that control exports of sensitive nuclear material and technology, would acquiesce to US requests for an exception to be made for Indian projects. "Members like Brazil and South Africa, who gave up nuclear weapon technology under the international rules, will be angry that India has been rewarded after breaking the rules for so long," said Praful Bidwai, a New Delhi-based analyst who has written extensively on India's nuclear programme. But it appears larger geopolitical considerations have prevailed in the White House....
...But the Indian security establishment is less enthusiastic about the deal. The Indian nuclear programme was designed to be self-sufficient. The problem is that it has run into an acute shortage of uranium, the fuel essential for nuclear reaction. It is this, and the need for expertise in a hi-tech fast-breeder programme, that has led it to seek some accommodation with Washington. "I am bothered by the fact we went and signed this at all. Really, if Delhi had stockpiled enough uranium when there were no bans on India making such purchases we would not be in Washington," said Bharat Karnad of the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi. "We have a weapons programme that really cannot be split into two and part overseen by the Americans. It is not in our national interest."
UPDATE (20 July, 10:24):
See also this in the IHT.
And this discussion from Stephen Cohen at the Brookings Institution.
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