Beck and Giddens on the EU

I have great respect for Ullrich Beck and Anthony Giddens and admire their work, especially the stuff on reflexive modernization. They miss something crucial, however, in this essay in The Guardian (some excerpts below) about the EU constitution and nationalism. First, their view is skewed by their focus on the standard neo-classical economic growth mantra. But, more importantly, while the "No" vote from France and the Netherlands on ratification of the EU constitution surely had nationalistic bases, nationalism was also surely not the only and perhaps not even the most important element of the "No." I haven't looked at studies on the breakdown of reasons behind the votes, so my information here is purely anecdotal, and I don't know much at all about the Netherlands case. In the case of France, I happen to have French in-laws -- many of them -- and they were about evenly decided on oui vs. non. Most of them read the entire document. All of them at least read lengthy summaries.

For those who voted no, the reasons were diverse, but two main interrelated ones were central, one a matter of substance, the other a matter of method.

First, the substance side: the proposed constitution was written by the neo-liberal Giscard d'Estaing and seemed to most no-voters as a move in the direction of American-style liberalization/globalization with an emphasis on economic growth uber alles. This is something many if not most French do not want. The French are a curious tribe -- a bit like the Amish in one main respect: although there are plenty of things France has adopted from American-style liberalism and American culture, there are plenty of other things they reject. It's a considered, deliberate rejection, not nearly as simplistic as many commentators on France in the American media would have it. Like the Amish in regard to modern technologies, some elements of modern liberalism appear consistent with other French values or even stretch them, but others are inconsistent. For instance, although the French health and social welfare system is troubled and overburdened by costs, no one wants to give up on it in the name of economic growth. The latter argument works a lot better in the US and especially among certain segments of society in the US and elsewhere. The French vote was not so much nationalist in this sense as it was a rejection of a document that moved in the direction of a society many felt was fundamentally unjust (although many socialists were on board with ratification). This led all the way down to a number of small details throughout the constitution. The real way to grant Beck and Giddens the nationalist argument is to point out two aspects of contemporary French society and politics. On the French far right, the rejection was nationalistic in the sense of a desire not to see more foreigners in France -- this is what Beck and Giddens seem often to have in mind. This fear extended basically to Turkey, as it does in Austria. The no vote appears to have exposed a similar problem in the Netherlands. For others in France, it was nationalism in a limited sense -- "we reject a constitution that calls for an economy and society that is foreign to us, and could have dire consequences for many things we treasure." The latter -- the currently liberalizing aspects of French political economy and their relation to French values and quality of life -- is an ongoing public debate in France.

Second, the constitution was produced without the French public's input. The complex document was only made available to the French public just prior to the actual vote (by a week or two, I believe, although I may be wrong on the timeframe). There was little debate over its details, little public discourse, almost zero public input, except for a wild flurry of discussion during that brief time between the document's availability and the vote. It was Giscard's baby all the way for France. The method was undemocratic and many took this as a sign of things to come for Europe more broadly. Many rejected the constitution for this very reason -- they feared the creation of a large, bureaucratic, undemocratic institution that would govern their lives. Beck and Giddens, I think, mistranslate this as somehow against diversity when in fact it is better construed as pro-diversity. Democracy ostensively allows for diverse voices.

So, when Beck and Giddens call for the EU as a new cosmopolitan approach and say it can be a reconstructive one, there may actually be more resources for doing so within the "Non" rather than the "Oui." I was pro-constitution myself for similar reasons at the level of global politics -- I think global European leadership could be a very good thing for the world as a counterbalance to present tendencies of American global leadership (a criterion for entry into the EU, for instance, is genuine progress on human rights). But I'm not French.

Here's a large chunk from the Beck and Giddens essay:

...The paradox is that, in the contemporary world, nationalist or isolationist thinking can be the worst enemy of the nation and its interests. The EU is an arena where formal sovereignty can be exchanged for real power, national cultures can be nurtured and economic success improved. The EU is better placed to advance national interests than nations could possibly do acting alone: in commerce, immigration, law and order, the environment, defence and many other areas.

Let us start to think of the EU not as an "unfinished nation" or an "incomplete federal state", but instead as a new type of cosmopolitan project. People feel afraid of a possible federal super-state and they are right to do so. A resurgent Europe can't rise up from the ruins of nations. The persistence of the nation is the condition of a cosmopolitan Europe; and today, for reasons just given, the reverse is true too. For a long time the process of European integration took place mainly by means of eliminating difference. But unity is not the same as uniformity. From a cosmopolitan point of view, diversity is not the problem; it is the solution....

...Various quite concrete consequences follow. If Europe is to be heard and valued on the world scene, we cannot declare an end to enlargement; nor can we leave the EU's system of governance as it is. Enlargement is the union's most powerful foreign-policy tool, a means of promoting the spread of peace, democracy and open markets. There is virtually no hope of stabilising the Balkans, for example, if the prospect of EU accession is cut off. The eruption of further conflict there would be a disaster.

The EU will also lose massive potential influence geopolitically if it decides to keep Turkey out. Turkey itself may become riven with conflicts. According to the latest opinion polls, support inside Turkey is waning in the face of the hostility some member states have towards the country's potential accession.

Similar considerations apply to governance. The EU cannot play an effective global role without more political innovation. The proposal to have a single EU foreign minister should be kept in play. More effective means of taking mutual decisions are needed than the cumbersome method left over from the Nice agreements. And the proposals in the constitution to have more consultation with national parliaments before EU policies are instituted are surely both democratic and sensible.

Political and diplomatic influence, however, always reflect economic weight. It is here above all that pro-Europeans must urge the commission and the leaders of member states to action. We know that the "no" votes in France and the Netherlands were motivated substantially by social and economic anxieties - anxieties that fed into the larger fears noted above. Despite its other successes, the European Union is simply not performing well enough economically. It has much lower growth levels than the US, not to mention less developed countries such as India and China. There are 20 million unemployed in the EU, and a further 93 million economically inactive people, many of whom would want to work if they could.

Europe simply must gear up for change. But along with reform we must preserve, and indeed deepen, our concern with social justice. Tony Blair has recently called for a Europe-wide debate on this issue. We believe he is right to do so. Some countries have been remarkably successful in combining economic growth with high levels of social protection and equality - especially the Nordic countries. Let's see what the rest of Europe can learn from them, as well as from other successful countries around the world....