Posted also at Black Sky Theory (in the blogroll):
I like this. The novel part is looking at the nature of "penalty," rather than justifications for punishment as social policy. Most philosophical arguments tend to consider the policy of capital punishment (CP) in terms of the broader society – a crime is a crime precisely because it harms others and, ostensibly, society as a whole. You're thinking about the actual penalty phase of the individual criminal by dropping the effect of CP on possible deterrence of would-be criminals. So, you move to a retributive-type argument.
To be pedantic, the main arguments in philosophy, at least, re CP come from three theoretical positions: that CP is/is not a deterrent in society regarding possible future crimes (future-oriented); that CP is/is not retribution for the crime already committed (past-oriented); that CP is wrong because criminals ought to and can undergo rehabilitation in which the punishment and motivation for rehabilitation stem from exclusion from society. [MT mentions the rehab issue]. All three are complicated further by the practical issue that CP is, in actual society, distributed unjustly according to race and means, and that the criminal justice system is fallible and, worse, often prosecutes erroneously and unjustly.
I tend to think, simply, that the latter consideration is good enough to get rid of CP. If somehow problems of both inequality and proof were overcome, I'd have to rethink this position. But it's good enough for me for now.
In your argument, there’s a tacking between deterrence and retributive views, and I think this is because you’ve constructed the argument to be directed at a specific audience: Christian pro-life, pro-CP people. Rehabilitative arguments often come from religious thinkers, for instance, but you’re looking at only those Christians making retributive claims. The idea behind retribution can take the form of eye for an eye (lex talionis) or less religious Kantian view that the crime of murder is a kind of opting out of a society in which the Golden Rule applies (or categorical imperatives against using human beings as means, etc.). CP completes the opt-out. Case closed. The tack re deterrence is that belief in a miserable next few decades functions as more of a deterrent than death, whether one believes in an afterlife or are atheist.
In psychological terms, I'm not sure how much it matters if a criminal is executed after one day in prison or five years. Five years (and appeals, etc.) may actually engender hope for a criminal who fears death that he'll see out his natural years. Only the God-fearing criminal would fear hell/God – and that may actually be a deterrent for would-be criminals in the first place. Tough to prove, though. So, the psychological element may satisfy the religious person seeking CP for a criminal (retribution), but it’s unclear what effect it has on the criminal himself. In deterrence terms, knowing that one could be executed the following day after conviction could actually be more horrifying to the criminal and/or potential criminal, with resorting to the atheism-or-believer case. But framing the discussion in this way assumes that the "penalty" part of CP is terror at the prospect of death, not the death itself.
I can see the merits of your move – it’s a sort of deconstructive critique of an inconsistent religious view. But I don’t know how much it extends to a broader argument against CP as criminal justice policy. For one thing, it grants Christians their most mythical beliefs as the basis for the argument and then builds a reductio out of those beliefs. The problem is that one has to grant them in the first place.
1 comment:
Posted also at Black Sky Theory (in the blogroll):
I like this. The novel part is looking at the nature of "penalty," rather than justifications for punishment as social policy. Most philosophical arguments tend to consider the policy of capital punishment (CP) in terms of the broader society – a crime is a crime precisely because it harms others and, ostensibly, society as a whole. You're thinking about the actual penalty phase of the individual criminal by dropping the effect of CP on possible deterrence of would-be criminals. So, you move to a retributive-type argument.
To be pedantic, the main arguments in philosophy, at least, re CP come from three theoretical positions: that CP is/is not a deterrent in society regarding possible future crimes (future-oriented); that CP is/is not retribution for the crime already committed (past-oriented); that CP is wrong because criminals ought to and can undergo rehabilitation in which the punishment and motivation for rehabilitation stem from exclusion from society. [MT mentions the rehab issue]. All three are complicated further by the practical issue that CP is, in actual society, distributed unjustly according to race and means, and that the criminal justice system is fallible and, worse, often prosecutes erroneously and unjustly.
I tend to think, simply, that the latter consideration is good enough to get rid of CP. If somehow problems of both inequality and proof were overcome, I'd have to rethink this position. But it's good enough for me for now.
In your argument, there’s a tacking between deterrence and retributive views, and I think this is because you’ve constructed the argument to be directed at a specific audience: Christian pro-life, pro-CP people. Rehabilitative arguments often come from religious thinkers, for instance, but you’re looking at only those Christians making retributive claims. The idea behind retribution can take the form of eye for an eye (lex talionis) or less religious Kantian view that the crime of murder is a kind of opting out of a society in which the Golden Rule applies (or categorical imperatives against using human beings as means, etc.). CP completes the opt-out. Case closed. The tack re deterrence is that belief in a miserable next few decades functions as more of a deterrent than death, whether one believes in an afterlife or are atheist.
In psychological terms, I'm not sure how much it matters if a criminal is executed after one day in prison or five years. Five years (and appeals, etc.) may actually engender hope for a criminal who fears death that he'll see out his natural years. Only the God-fearing criminal would fear hell/God – and that may actually be a deterrent for would-be criminals in the first place. Tough to prove, though. So, the psychological element may satisfy the religious person seeking CP for a criminal (retribution), but it’s unclear what effect it has on the criminal himself. In deterrence terms, knowing that one could be executed the following day after conviction could actually be more horrifying to the criminal and/or potential criminal, with resorting to the atheism-or-believer case. But framing the discussion in this way assumes that the "penalty" part of CP is terror at the prospect of death, not the death itself.
I can see the merits of your move – it’s a sort of deconstructive critique of an inconsistent religious view. But I don’t know how much it extends to a broader argument against CP as criminal justice policy. For one thing, it grants Christians their most mythical beliefs as the basis for the argument and then builds a reductio out of those beliefs. The problem is that one has to grant them in the first place.
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