Fukuyama on Chávez

I'm a bit slow on the news. This article by Francis Fukuyama appeared in Saturday's Washington Post. The basic claim is that Chávez is an anachronism whose oil wealth allows him to conceal Venezuela's backwardness through the boosting of social and education programs that garner populist support. In the meantime, Chávez toodles around the globe talking to various leaders - especially those who irk the US - and consolidating his position as a geopolitically significant figure. Fukuyama sees Chávez 's Venezuela as neglecting the development of a position in the global economy and thus dooming the country to a sad fate if oil revenues plummet.

Granted that this is an opinion piece in the Post, rather than a scholarly analysis. However, like most assessments of Venezuela from an American point of view, there's much left wanting. What, precisely, is the problem with Chávez for Fukuyama? Let's quote him.

Early on in Hugo Chávez's political career, the Venezuelan president attacked my notion that liberal democracy together with a market economy represents the ultimate evolutionary direction for modern societies -- the "end of history." When asked what lay beyond the end of history, he offered a one-word reply: "Chavismo."... The idea that contemporary Venezuela represents a social model superior to liberal democracy is absurd.

OK, one ego against another. But let's see if there's any substance to Fukuyama's claim. Here's what he offers:

In his eight years as president, Chávez has capitalized on his country's oil wealth to take control of congress, the courts, trade unions, electoral commissions and the state oil company. Proposed legislation that would limit foreign funding could soon constrain nongovernmental organizations as well. And people who signed a recall petition against Chávez in the run-up to a 2004 referendum on his rule later found their names posted on the Web site of a pro-Chávez legislator; if they worked for the government or wanted to do business with it, they were out of a job and out of luck.

I'm not sure how Fukuyama comes to any position of authority on Venezuela, but the above certainly doesn't inspire confidence. It's the standard line taken against Chávez. And it includes that neat little neocon twist so beloved by the propaganda wing.

First, it's unclear how oil wealth equals taking control of the congress, etc. The state oil company, perhaps, but that's a tautaology - oil wealth enabled him to take over oil wealth? Come on, Francis. Chávez nationalized the oil industry in order to rewrite non-exploitative contracts with the major oil companies operating in Venezuela. For sure, this move gave Chávez great power on the global scene, and Chávez does seem to love his power. But the multinationals operating in Venezuela mostly agreed to the new terms - it was still worth it to do business. Now, if one is an economic partisan of Fukuyama's stripe, one says to oneself that willingness to pay determines price, including within the terms of contracts. If Chávez can rewrite contracts and oil companies will sign them, doesn't this suggest that previous contracts were heavily weighted against the interests of Venezuela? Yes, oil is special. But that doesn't mean it ought to be given away.

Second, as for "controlling congress," etc., this is a more complicated history. The Venezuelan opposition has boycotted one election after another. This has led to the near-total absence of opposition members in congress, especially since the December 2005 elections. Oil has nothing to do with it. It is a strategy of the opposition in order to place Chávez in a position of dictatorship in order to prove the point. Granted, Chávez doesn't mind. But the common theme on the US side is the Chavista power-grab. Facts are more complex. It is true that Chávez has far too much power, and the Bolivarian constitution is a mess. Nevertheless, one could easily make the case that the opposition is as responsible if not more so for the current situation in Venezuela as Chávez. A level-headed assessment of Venezuela simply has to come to terms with this. Fukuyama uses ostensibly level-headed language to cloak what is basically an uneducated political position... or worse.

Further, the executive nominates the judicial in Venezuela, as it does in the US. Chávez has also done so. Check every other case. Fukuyama is simply repeating the mantra that has gotten the US into trouble elsewhere: build up the dictator so that he requires toppling.

Fukuyama also mentions a "relatively free press." The press is largely opposition, and much of the political power of the opposition is represented and activated in the opposition press. I gave an interview in November to the largest of these newspapers on the nature of global economics and politics in which I was critical of status quo liberalization (as I am also of state-run economies) on environmental grounds. The paper refused to print the interview. And it was a damn good one, if I say so myself.

In other words, Fukuyama is simply lazily repeating the same old story about Venezuela. He gets a couple of things right. First, Chávez's policies are in many ways a continuation of previous Venezuelan governments' policies. Both have relied heavily on oil revenues. Whereas previous governments, however, allowed the poverty rate in an otherwise wealthy nation to rise to 50% with almost zero social and educational infrastructure to help alleviate poverty, Chávez has renegotiated the terms of that oil wealth to divert it into school and health clinic programs as well as construction of thousands of homes for the poor. Corruption remains rampant, yes. It's as bad as pre-Chávez decades. But there is significant assistance going to half of the Venezuelan population now. Beyond this, talk to members of the government - they'll say that the Chávez government is not anti-capitalist. Given the historical rape of Latin America, they're seeking fair terms of trade and an economy based on equity and social justice. Look at the new centers in the poor ranchos - job programs are not simply welfare programs, but skills training programs intended to wean local factories from initial state support. Whether they'll be successful or not remains to be seen. The point is that this is not simply a burgeoning welfare state.

Critics say the clinics and food programs and new housing is all about "consolidating the base." Depends on your outlook. I've seen firsthand the successes of education reforms, the new clinics, food programs, and construction. It can be done better, but this is already far better than pre-Chávez governments. Venezuela needs a reconciliation between the Chavistas and the well-educated and relatively wealthy opposition. There's talk of this in quiet circles, but such a reconciliation is not in the interests of many in the opposition, US interests, and the version of Chávez as power-hungry. A reconciliation could serve ultimately to build better clinics and housing projects, a better and more diverse domestic and global economy, and better technological development. As it is, the country is truncated, domestically antagonistic. Black-or-white commentators like Fukuyama get this all wrong. Venezuela can seek a novel route, and the Chavistas are as important a part of this route as rentist opposition members.

The final word on Fukuyama's piece is that it's useless. As scholars are wont to do, he coins the catchy term "postmodern authoritarianism" (which I think applies to the current US administration more than anything) without defining it. Let it seep in, package it with one-sided perspectives, and repeat a few clichés... like the collapsed bridge as a symbol of Chávez's reign. The bridge had been a mess before Chávez ever came to power. He should have done something about it, but so should have others.

Last December, a bridge on the road connecting the Venezuelan capital to its international airport collapsed, diverting traffic into the mountains and stretching a 45-minute journey into one lasting several hours. A two-lane emergency highway now bears this traffic; renovation of the bridge is still months away. The bridge epitomizes what is happening to Venezuela today: As Chávez jets to Minsk, Moscow and Tehran in search of influence and prestige, the country's infrastructure is collapsing.

The postmodern authoritarianism of Chávez's Venezuela is durable only while oil prices remain high. Yet it presents a distinct challenge from that of totalitarianism because it allows for democratic choice and caters to real social needs. At a recent conference of business leaders here, I witnessed many speakers openly criticize Chávez; their remarks were cited in the mainstream media. There is no police state in Venezuela -- at least not yet.

Read the article and tell me if you can spot the evidence for any of Fukuyama's fear-mongering claims.