Loving or Fighting the Taliban

The War in Context defends Bill Frist's remark that the Taliban should be brought into Afghanistan's government.

Last month, Lakhdar Brahimi, the Algerian U.N. diplomat who had a key role in attempting to steer Afghanistan's post-Taliban political development, had this to say:

One of my own biggest mistakes was not to speak to the Taliban in 2002 and 2003. It was not possible to get them in the tent at the Bonn conference because of 9/11 and they themselves were not eager. But immediately after that, we should've spoken to those who were willing to speak to us. That I consider to be my mistake -- a very, very big mistake.

If Afghanistan is ever to have an effective government, every major constituency in the country will need to feel that they have some form of representation. For as long as there is a weak central government that depends for its survival on the presence of foreign troops, the Taliban will be able to present itself as an expression of popular resistance. The more ruthless the counter-insurgency becomes, the more the Taliban will grow in strength.

OK. Frist doesn't deserve the condemnation for his remark, despite his office's attempt to re-spin it (and thus, their own PR condemnation). But recall that this "representation" would be rather similar to Hezbollah's status in the Lebanese government, and pragmatic thinking about Hezbollah has quickly yielded to absolutes.

UPDATE (3:45):

MagicRuss says in the comments,

... By alienating a large portion of the Pashtun population in Afghanistan, we've given legitimacy among the people to the Taliban movement that it didn't necessarily enjoy prior to the U.S. invasion. In that context, as a popular resistance movement with popular support, Frist's comments are probably correct. And frankly I think the Taliban would be amenable to negotiation, since most of the charismatic mullahs who led the group's radicalization and purge of independent thinkers are gone.

However, the situation in Pakistan suggests that inclusion of the Taliban in an Afghan government will prove problematic for the War against Al-Qaeda. For more than a few, the Taliban is synonomous with Al-Qaeda. While technically incorrect this speaks to the close ties between the two groups, including similar ideologies and some shared military operations prior to the U.S. invasion. In addition, Pashtuns are thought to be harboring the remaining elements of Bin Laden's inner circle, including him.

Pakistan's recent, regrettable deal with its Northwest Frontier Provinces (the Waziristan Accord) has basically ended any formal efforts to apprehend OBL and dismantle or destroy Al-Qaeda on the Pakistan side of the border. I believe that the formal inclusion of the Taliban in the Afghan government would do the same in Afghanistan, which may allow Al-Qaeda to regroup and at the very least, works against our (bi-partisan) efforts to weaken or destroy Al-Qaeda.

Therefore, I don't think Democratic condemnation of Frist's remarks is completely uncalled for. In addition, I don't think the situation is really comparable to that in Lebanon with Hezbollah. For it truly to compare, Hezbollah, a group with basically a regional (almost local) focus, would have to be harboring a different terrorist group that franchises itself and plans worldwide acts of violence....