Looking for Solutions in Iraq

The Washington Post headlines today with this article on disagreement between the administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on what to do in Iraq. Bush seems to want, rather pointlessly, a McCainian increase in troops of a size that wouldn't make much impact on the ground. Others, of course, have suggested the "Darwin [sic] Option". The Joint Chiefs point out that Bush has no real plan. On and on we go while Bush supposedly deliberates.

What's most interesting about the article, however, comes at the end. Watch for a report being published today by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (but not yet as of the time of this post). The WaPo hints at the content of the report:

The new report calls the study group's recommendations "not nearly radical enough" and says that "its prescriptions are no match for its diagnosis." It continues: "What is needed today is a clean break both in the way the U.S. and other international actors deal with the Iraqi government, and in the way the U.S. deals with the region."

The Iraqi government and military should not be treated as "privileged allies" because they are not partners in efforts to stem the violence but rather parties to the conflict, it says. Trying to strengthen the fragile government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will not contribute to Iraq's stability, it adds. Iraq's escalating crisis cannot be resolved militarily, the report says, and can be solved only with a major political effort.

The International Crisis Group proposes three broad steps: First, it calls for creation of an international support group, including the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Iraq's six neighbors, to press Iraq's constituents to accept political compromise.

Second, it urges a conference of all Iraqi players, including militias and insurgent groups, with support from the international community, to forge a political compact on controversial issues such as federalism, distribution of oil revenue, an amnesty, the status of Baath Party members and a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. Finally, it suggests a new regional strategy that would include engagement with Syria and Iran and jump-starting the moribund Arab-Israeli peace process.

I'm looking forward to the ICG report. But I seriously doubt Bush is after anything but saving face, and so will not pay much heed.

This is what we are facing, however. We simply have to engage in a radical overhaul of how the war has been conceptualized from the very beginning. I think this includes how "terrorism" has been used by the Bush administration as a device to sanction the circumvention of international and domestic constraints on their own now-directionless policies. This circumvention stems from how the war and terrorism have been framed to the American public since the very beginning.

To be blunt, it's long past time for Bush to stop sacrificing troops and any remaining international legitimacy in order to maintain appearances, and time for us to sacrifice Bush.

See more here from March 2006. Although I'm not sure I'd say the same things now, some of it still holds.

UPDATE (6am):

Here's the report: After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq
And here is the section on what the US should do immediately to stem violence. Note how much of this is a response to US mistakes (apart from being in Iraq in the first place).

18. Adopt a less aggressive military posture in Iraq by:

(a) redirecting resources to a program of embedding U.S. troops in Iraqi units; and

(b) moving away from fighting the insurgency to focusing on protecting the civilian population, and in particular halting blind sweeps that endanger civilians, antagonise the population and have had limited effect on the insurgency.

19. Redeploy troops along the frontlines of the unfolding civil war, notably by filling in the current security vacuum in Baghdad.

20. Focus on limiting the militias’ role to protecting civilians in places where government forces cannot, rather than seek to forcibly disband them, while taking strong action against political assassinations, sectarian attacks, or attempts to overrun government offices.

21. Avoid steps to engineer a cabinet reshuffle aimed at side-lining Muqtada al-Sadr, which would further inflame the situation.

22. Shelve plans to hurriedly expand the Iraqi security apparatus and focus instead on vetting, restructuring, and retraining existing units.

23. Free and compensate Iraqi prisoners detained by the U.S. without charge.

24. Compensate Iraqis who have suffered as a result of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign.

25. Condition short-term financial support on the government reversing its policy of serving certain constituencies at the expense of others (most notably with regard to salary payment and basic service delivery).

26. Abandon the super-embassy project and move a reduced embassy to a more neutral location.

27. Publicly deny any intention of establishing long-term military bases or seeking to control Iraq’s oil.